Factual Example and Metaphor in Kimberlé Crenshaw’s Intersectionality Framework
Black feminist legal theorist Kimberlé Crenshaw coined the term “intersectionality” as a metaphor for understanding how society, from multiple angles, can discriminate against people of multiple identities, creating confusion and ignorance about the discrimination. She centers black women in her work, arguing, “It seems that placing those who currently are marginalized in the center is the most effective way to resist efforts to compartmentalize experiences and undermine potential collective action… that such an effort would encourage us to look beneath the prevailing conceptions of discrimination and to challenge the complacency that accompanies belief in the effectiveness of this framework” (Crenshaw 167). I focus my argument on Crenshaw’s text “Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics,” specifically, the rhetorical strategy of drawing on women’s experiences to illuminate intersectionality as a metaphor to a hostile and/or ignorant audience. In this essay, I argue that Crenshaw needed to draw on women’s experiences to explain intersectionality because an audience that is unfamiliar requires real and digestible information to resonate with new information.
Crenshaw relies on three court cases that demonstrate discrimination against black women to present real and digestible examples of the single-axis framework to her audience. In DeGraffenreid v General Motors, five black women sued General Motors for their termination during seniority-based layoffs in 1970. Because General Motors did not hire black women until 1964, the women argued that the seniority system perpetuated past systems of discrimination. The district court rejected the plaintiff’s attempt to file suit on behalf of black women specifically, claiming, “Plaintiffs have failed to cite any decisions which have stated that black women are a special class to be protected from discrimination” (141). By using the court’s own words, Crenshaw demonstrates its own inability to see the difference between women’s experiences and black women’s experiences. She again draws on the court’s claim that “[t]he legislative history surrounding Title VII does not indicate that the goal of the statute was to create a new classification of ‘black women’ who would have greater standing than, for example, a black male” (142). By choosing these specific quotes cited directly from the court, Crenshaw uses evidence that clearly demonstrates the court’s perpetual ignorance of black women as being different from and having different experiences than white women or black men.
This sentiment proves true for Moore v. Hughes Helicopter and Payne v Travenol. In Moore v. Hughes Helicopter, “[t]he court rejected Moore’s bid to represent all females apparently because her attempt to specify her race was seen as being at odds with the standard allegation that the employer simply discriminated ‘against females’” (144). Similarly to DeGraffenreid v. General Motors, the court failed to see how black women were a “special case,” and could be discriminated against in ways beyond that of a white woman. In fact, the court found that Moore filing specifically on behalf of black women “raised serious doubts as to Moore's ability to adequately represent white female employees” (144). By using this case, Crenshaw again demonstrates the court’s use of the single-axis framework to limit their protection of black women. In Payne v. Travenol, the court found that the retributions rewarded to black women could not be extended to black men “due to presumed class conflicts in cases where sex additionally disadvantaged Black women” (148). By choosing these three specific cases, Crenshaw demonstrates the single-axis framework at work in three distinct ways. In DeGraffenreid, the court sees black women as not distinct enough from white women. In Moore, the court sees women as too distinct from white women to protect them, and in Payne, too distinct from black males to protect them.
Because Crenshaw birthed the framework of intersectionality, the readers of the legal journal she wrote in, or anyone else for that matter, would not have been familiar with intersectionality. Thus, Crenshaw needed to present real examples, not just grandiose, theoretical discourse that might overwhelm the audience. Crenshaw’s strategy of using real examples succeeds because these cases clearly display the single-axis framework that Crenshaw describes as the problem. Her audience can deny the concept that the law discriminates on a single-axis framework, but they cannot deny the court’s own words and actions which show themselves discriminating on a single-axis framework. Presenting the audience with a real case with actors and actions resonates more and therefore becomes more digestible. Once the audience can understand and digest the information, it becomes easier for them to see it as true. After Crenshaw demonstrates the single-axis framework at work in the legal system, she sets herself up to then explain intersectionality in a similar, digestible manner: with a metaphor.
Crenshaw demonstrates intersectionality with a metaphor of a traffic intersection, which presents the framework in a familiar, comprehensible way. “Discrimination, like traffic through an intersection, may flow in one direction, and it may flow in another. If an accident happens in an intersection, it can be caused by cars traveling from any number of directions and, sometimes, from all of them. Similarly, if a black woman is harmed because she is in the intersection, her injury could result from sex discrimination or race discrimination” (149). Crenshaw introduces the metaphor, notably using plain language, as if describing something obvious. She employs the metaphor of an intersection because nearly all American readers can grasp it with ease. She tiptoes past the thinking mind and lulls the audience into a non-thinking state. By doing so, Crenshaw sets herself up to then explain how the law acts in illogical ways when dealing with intersectional discrimination. She argues, “Providing legal relief only when black women show that their claims are based on race or on sex is analogous to calling an ambulance for the victim only after the driver responsible for the injuries is identified” (149). With the metaphor of an intersection, Crenshaw points out the ridiculousness of the court’s dealing with black women. By giving us a metaphor, Crenshaw presents familiar information that the audience can apply to the new information that they’re trying to understand. Any rational audience member must agree on the irrationality of calling an ambulance after identifying the responsible driver. Given that assumption, the rational audience member could not logically disagree that it is also irrational to provide legal relief only when black women prove the basis of their discrimination.
Crenshaw’s pioneering critique of anti-discrimination doctrine and the intersectionality framework has begun to change the way the law approaches people of multiple identities and backgrounds. Intersectionality has become a household term today and Crenshaw’s rhetoric has begun to permeate the U.S. legal system. California recently became the first state to cite Crenshaw and write the intersectionality framework into anti-discrimination doctrine (Wentzel et al.). In California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act, legislation “prohibits discrimination not just on the basis of individual protected traits, but also on the basis of the intersectionality of two or more protected traits” (Wentzel et al.). The law agrees with Crenshaw’s framework that forcing a plaintiff to narrow down their discrimination to one distinctive identity misses the possibility that it could be a result of a combination of identities. The California legislature recognizes that “[w]here two or more bases for discrimination or harassment exist, they cannot be neatly reduced to distinct components. The attempt to bisect a person’s identity at the combination of multiple protected characteristics often distorts or ignores the particular nature of their experiences” (Wentzel et al.). In accordance with Crenshaw’s scholarship, the California legislature wisely expanded their anti-discrimination doctrine with the understanding that people with fused identities often experience unique discrimination outside the bounds of one specific category.
In this essay, I have argued that Crenshaw uses real examples and metaphor in her presentation of the intersectionality framework to plainly introduce new information. Without them, her audience could have easily gotten lost in legal jargon and missed the understanding of the single-axis framework as it plays out in real courts. I then argued that Crenshaw presents intersectionality with a metaphor so her audience might resonate with a concept from their own lived experiences, therefore understanding intersectionality more deeply. Crenshaw likely couldn’t reach as large an audience without presenting factual court opinions and flirting with the familiarity of the intersection metaphor. As a testament to her success in creating the intersectionality framework as a guide to navigate anti-discrimination doctrine, a state on the opposite coast of the country from where Crenshaw wrote her paper recently adopted her framework in anti-discrimination legislation. In one sense, black feminist legal scholars can view California’s legislation as a success in implementing intersectionality into the law. On the other hand, one might ask why no state has done this sooner than thirty-five years after Crenshaw published her paper. Will progress continue to move at this crawling pace, if at all? In all, Crenshaw succeeds in introducing a new framework by providing familiar examples that any audience could digest. Whether or not her framework will be able to entirely penetrate the U.S. legal system, one must wait and see. But the way the intersectionality framework has gained traction thus far can certainly give supporters hope, even for slow progress.
References
Crenshaw, Kimberlé. “Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics,” University of Chicago Legal Forum, vol. 1989, no. 1, 1989.
Wentzel, Karen E. “California Legislative Year-End Review: Preparing Employers for 2025 (US).” Legal News & Business Law News. National Law Review, 10 Oct. 2024. https://natlawreview.com/article/california-legislative-year-end-review-preparing-employers-2025-us. Accessed 07 Nov. 2024.